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The golden rule of public finance is based upon the notion that intergenerational equity requires
that the cost of public expenditures be spread over time in a manner that reflects the intertemporal
distribution of the benefits generated by those expenditures. This is often translated into a rule that
the budget be structurally balanced in accrual accounting terms. This article considers the form of
accrual accounting that is most suited to the task of measuring the consistency of fiscal policy with
the golden rule. It recommends a combination of the real capital maintenance approach (also
known as ‘current purchasing power accounting’) and annuity depreciation. Such an approach
differs from ‘current cost accounting’, which has dominated public sector models of accrual
accounting in recent years. The meaning of balance-sheet measures is also considered, and it is
concluded that the golden rule is more appropriately expressed as an accrual balanced budget
requirement than as a requirement for the maintenance of constant net worth.
JEL classification: H6, M40.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intergenerational equity is widely regarded as a key fiscal policy criterion. A key
traditional conception of intergenerational equity is embodied in the so-called
‘golden rule’ of public finance. The golden rule asserts that taxpayers in each
time period should as a group contribute to public expenditures from which they
derive benefits in accordance with their share of the benefits generated by those
expenditures. In doing so, they may be regarded as ‘paying their way’, without
either subsidising, or being subsidised by, taxpayers in other time periods.
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The golden rule can be contrasted with the more familiar balanced budget
standpoint, which calls for all expenditure to be financed by contemporaneous
taxes. Many advocates of balanced budgets have taken the view that any use of
debt amounts to an unfair imposition upon future generations (Kowalcky and
LeLoup, 1993). Advocates of the golden rule (for example, Musgrave (1988) and
Fitzgerald (1996, vol. 1, p. 25)) disagree with this. While they agree that
intergenerational equity requires the contemporaneous tax funding of any
expenditure the benefits of which are entirely enjoyed contemporaneously, they
reject the proposition that expenditure that generates benefits over multiple time
periods should, as a matter of principle, be tax-financed at the time it is
undertaken. They note, for example, that assets such as schools, roads and
bridges yield benefits over considerable periods of time, and suggest that there is
therefore nothing equitable about requiring that their full costs be met by
taxpayers at the time of construction. From the golden rule perspective, what
intergenerational equity requires is, instead, that the costs associated with such
expenditure should be spread over time in accordance with the distribution over
time of the benefits that they generate. It defends, within limits, the use of debt
for this purpose.
The golden rule is often portrayed as a principle pertaining to the
intertemporal allocation of the tax burden of financing capital expenditure. This
is understandable, given that expenditure that generates benefits over multiple
time periods corresponds approximately to the conventional concept of capital
expenditure. Indeed, in this paper, we shall for convenience treat the concepts as
synonymous. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that capital expenditure is
conventionally defined by reference to the physical durability of assets, rather
than by reference to the timing of benefits. There are forms of expenditure that
produce benefits over multiple time periods without producing a durable
physical asset (a good example is the massive expenditure undertaken to finance
the war effort during the Second World War, much of the benefit of which
accrued to post-war generations).
1
The balanced budget view has been fostered by the traditional public sector
use of the ‘cash’ accounting system under which all expenditure (including all
capital expenditure) is treated as a debit in the financial year it takes place. Cash
accounting differs fundamentally from private sector practice, which employs
accrual accounting. Accrual accounting replaces expenditure as a debit concept
with the concept of expenses attributable to the current financial year. A key
difference between accrual and cash accounting is that the former records
depreciation as an expense, rather than capital expenditure itself. Expenses
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minus revenue may be referred to as the accrual operating result, by contrast to
the conventional ‘cash’ budget balance, which is expenditure minus revenue.
2
It is therefore natural for advocates of the golden rule to call for the use of
accrual accounting (‘resource accounting’ in current British public sector jargon
(UK Treasury, 1994 and 1995)) as the basis for public sector financial reporting.
Concretely, they argue for a policy of balanced accrual budgets (i.e. a zero
accrual operating result). In stock terms, this is taken to be equivalent to the
maintenance of constant ‘net worth’.
Fiscal policy serves macroeconomic policy purposes as well as
intergenerational equity objectives. Some modification of the basic principle of
balanced accrual budgets may therefore be required to reflect one’s macro-
theoretical standpoint. It is commonplace in this context for the golden rule to be
viewed as requiring structurally balanced accrual budgets   where ‘structural’
refers to adjustment of the budget balance measure to eliminate the effects of the
business cycle. The distinction between structural and cyclical budget balances,
although by no means unproblematic in practice, is a widely accepted one. We
abstract from business-cycle considerations in the analysis below.
The primary purpose of this article is to outline the key elements of an
accounting methodology suitable for measuring compliance with the golden rule.
This methodology differs in certain respects from the methodology that has
tended to be favoured by governments that have adopted, or are in the process of
adopting, accrual accounting within their budget-dependent departmental core
(including the UK, Australia and New Zealand). The nature of these
methodological differences is therefore discussed, with particular attention to the
potential of the currently favoured accrual accounting methodology to distort
somewhat measures of compliance with the golden rule.
The intention is to present the central issues in as accessible a manner as
possible. As a consequence, the analysis below is very much simplified. It
ignores, for example, accounting issues related to deferred expenditures such as
civil service pensions, in order to concentrate on the crucial issue of the
treatment of capital. It also ignores the presence of income-earning public sector
operations, so as to focus squarely on the distribution through time of the tax
burden of financing ‘social’ assets (i.e. assets that provide benefits to the
community without earning revenue for the government). While readers should
bear in mind that the story has been simplified in this manner, they may rest
assured that these simplifications do not detract from the validity of the broad
story that is told below.
It is important to acknowledge in passing that exponents of so-called
‘generational accounting’ have strongly challenged any focus upon deficits as
measures of intergenerational equity. In their view, ‘deficit numbers, no matter
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how they are measured, reflect nothing more than the rules of accounting used in
their computation’ (Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 1995, p. 1). From this
perspective, accrual deficit measures are of no more use than cash accounting
measures. I have evaluated the claims of generational accounting elsewhere,
concluding that this rejection of the relevance of deficit concepts is unwarranted
and that the case for the golden rule approach remains a strong one (Robinson,
1998a). A review of the complex issues involved is, however, beyond the scope
of the present paper.
II. A SINGLE-ASSET MODEL
We start by considering what the golden rule would mean in terms of the costs of
a single asset, viewed in isolation. Here we use a specific example. Imagine for
this purpose that the government acquires a single facility with a defined lifespan
of, say, 10 years. Suppose that the initial cost of the facility is £20 million and
that the level of benefits generated for the community by the facility happens to
be the same in each of its 10 years of life. Debt is used to achieve the objective
of distributing the costs of the facility over the 10 years of its life in accordance
with the distribution of the benefits that it generates for the community. To
understand how the golden rule should operate, we therefore imagine that the
£20 million initial cost is entirely borrowed. For simplicity, we assume that the
rate of interest that the government pays on those borrowings is equal to the
opportunity cost of capital and take both to be a constant 5 per cent.
FIGURE 1
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Spreading the cost over the lifespan of the facility means that, over the asset’s
life, taxes must both cover (‘amortise’) the initial cost and meet interest
commitments along the way. At the end of the asset’s life, the debt incurred to
cover the initial cost of the asset must have been fully repaid. In apportioning
costs between each of the 10 years of the asset’s life, it is necessary to take into
account not only amortisation of the principal, but also the interest payments. In
other words, what we have to apportion is the total taxpayer contribution in each
time period towards the costs of the facility, whether in the form of interest or
amortisation.
Because in our example we have assumed that the level of benefits generated
by the facility is constant through its life, the golden rule requires that the tax
contribution in each year be equal, yet sufficient over the 10 years to meet all
interest and principal. Figure 1 shows what this implies.
Each year, a tax contribution of approximately £2.6 million is required.
However, the breakdown of this between interest and amortisation payments
changes over time, with interest payments declining and amortisation payments
increasing. The approach that this embodies is essentially the same as that of a
conventional housing mortgage, in which equalising the periodic payments made
by the borrower over the term of the mortgage means that interest payments
initially constitute the bulk of the periodic repayment, with amortisation of
principal growing in significance over the term of the mortgage. The golden rule
does not, of course, stipulate equal tax contributions in each year as a matter of
principle. The general notion, rather, is that, if citizens in a given time period
derive benefits from a facility that are n times greater than the benefits enjoyed
by citizens in another specific time period, then it is consistent with
intergenerational equity to require the former to make a collective tax
contribution towards financing the facility that is n times greater than that of the
latter. The equal annual payments that characterise the above example are simply
the result of the simplifying assumption that the level of benefits generated by
the facility is the same each year. If the distribution of benefits over time were
different, so in principle would be the distribution of costs (principal plus
interest) required by the golden rule.
This cost allocation methodology has a number of clear implications for a
system of accrual accounting designed to serve a long-run fiscal policy based
upon the golden rule.
First, when we record ‘depreciation’ in our accrual operating statement, we
must use that term to refer to the amortisation of the initial cost of the asset. The
term depreciation has a range of alternative meanings in accounting theory, and
it is therefore imperative that we are clear about the sense in which we are using
the term.
Second, if we want the contribution of taxpayers in each time period to reflect
their share of the benefits generated by the facility over its life, it is their
contribution in real rather than nominal pounds that is relevant. We thereforeFiscal Studies
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need to adopt the right form of accounting to take into account the impact of
inflation. The appropriate methodology for this purpose happens to be what is
known as ‘current purchasing power accounting’ (CPP). CPP must not be
confused with ‘current cost accounting’ (CCA), which is discussed below. In
brief, what CPP does is to amortise the initial real cost of the asset as
depreciation. As the counterpart to this, it in effect records real (rather than
nominal) interest payments as an expense.
Third, the cost amortisation principle that is employed must be one that
explicitly allocates total costs   interest as well as amortisation of principal 
over time in the manner illustrated above. This depreciation method is known as
‘annuity’ or ‘present value’ depreciation (Myers, 1972; Baxter, 1981). It differs
significantly from conventional depreciation, which considers the principal
3 in
isolation and amortises it without taking into account the fact that interest
payments are also being made.
To clarify the difference between conventional and annuity depreciation,
consider once again our hypothetical facility. Given the equal distribution of
benefits over time which has been assumed in this example, conventional
depreciation would certainly employ a ‘straight-line’ depreciation schedule
which apportions the principal equally over the 10 years of the asset’s life (at £2
million per year). The implications of this for total taxpayer contributions in
each year of the asset’s life are shown in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2
Implications of Conventional Depreciation for the Expensing of a Single Asset
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The important point is that, notwithstanding the fact that straight-line
depreciation has been used, conventional depreciation ‘front-loads’ costs
because it ignores interest. That is, it has the effect of allocating costs
disproportionately to the earlier years in the life of the facility, with a
commensurate reduction of cost allocation towards the end of the facility’s life.
This effect is greater, the longer the lifespan of the asset concerned.
The fourth key issue is the nature of the ‘balance sheet’ consistent with our
preferred cost allocation model. The balance sheet in any accrual system records
‘values’ for assets and liabilities. Total assets minus total liabilities is referred to
as ‘net worth’ (or by a variety of other terms, such as ‘net equity’). If our
hypothetical facility is the only public sector asset, and if we also assume that
the golden rule has in the past been consistently applied, then there would be no
outstanding public debt other than debt employed to finance the facility. The
‘value’ that our balance sheet would record for the facility at any stage in its life
would simply be its remaining unamortised (real) cost at that time. This would
correspond to the portion of the original borrowings employed to finance the
facility that has not yet been repaid. Thus the result of the application of the
golden rule would be that government assets (the ‘value’ of the facility) would
equal government liabilities (the remaining outstanding debt), and net worth
would be zero. This would remain true at each stage during the facility’s life. For
example, at the end of the facility’s life, the remaining debt would be zero, the
asset value would be zero and net worth would still be zero.
A crucial point to remember about such a balance sheet is that the ‘value’
recorded against the facility (the ‘book’ value) is not a measure of what it is
worth. That is, it does not purport to represent the facility’s ‘economic’ value.
4
The balance-sheet valuation is, instead, a record of unamortised cost. Having
said this, it can be shown that one of the implications of employing present value
depreciation in the manner advocated above is that the ratio of book value to
economic value remains constant over the life of each asset. This means that
depreciation in each time period is proportional to the change in the asset’s
economic value during that period. It nevertheless remains the case that book
value and economic value are not the same, and it may therefore be said that the
use of the term ‘value’ for fixed assets in balance sheets can be misleading. The
same applies to the term ‘net worth’. As is discussed below, this has certainly
been the source of a number of serious misconceptions. It is, unfortunately, not
practicable to invent a new set of terminology to avoid these misconceptions.
The above analysis assumes certainty and perfect information. Under such
hypothetical conditions, a depreciation schedule could be set for each asset
which precisely mirrors the time pattern of benefits that that asset generates. The
real world, unfortunately, is not so tractable. There is, in practice, considerable
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uncertainty about the time pattern of benefits (and future interest rates), so that
depreciation schedules must inevitably be imperfect. Moreover, a policy of
tailoring depreciation schedules to suit individual assets can be regarded as
creating, under such conditions of uncertainty, unacceptable scope for
opportunistic ‘creative accounting’. Given this, the application of standardised
depreciation schedules (for example, straight-line depreciation) has much to
recommend it, notwithstanding the essentially arbitrary nature of such schedules.
These realities do not constitute arguments against the application of the golden
rule. They are simply reminders that, in the real world, any practicable fiscal
rule can only represent an approximation of the underlying theoretical principles
that it seeks to effect.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF MULTIPLE ASSETS
Shifting from a model based upon a single fixed asset to a model with multiple
assets does not, in itself, change any of this   at least if we continue to assume,
for the time being, that the golden rule as specified above has been consistently
respected in the past. A number of useful further properties can, however, be
drawn out.
One important point is that the golden rule principle of balanced accrual
budgets has an approximate counterpart in terms of the conventional ‘cash’
budget balance. The golden rule stipulates that, each financial year, repayment of
debt incurred to finance past capital expenditure should take place according to
the amortisation principles outlined above. However, at the same time, new
capital expenditure is notionally funded entirely from new borrowings.
Borrowing to finance current expenditure is not permitted. This means that
actual net borrowings must equal new capital expenditure minus depreciation,
which is the change in the stock of capital (also referred to as ‘net’ investment).
Net borrowing is what the ‘cash’ accounting deficit measures,
5 so what this
means is that the golden rule implies, approximately, that the cash budget deficit
must equal net public investment. Given, further, that the cash deficit equals the
sum of current and capital expenditure minus revenue, this is equivalent to a
requirement that revenue should equal current expenditure plus depreciation. Yet
another way of expressing the same point is to say that there should be a fiscal
current account surplus   defined as revenue minus current expenditure 
equal to the amount of depreciation in the relevant time period. The current
account surplus is, obviously, a cash accounting concept.
The golden rule also has direct implications for the relationship between the
public debt and the capital stock. Net borrowings equal the change in debt
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(subject to the qualification discussed below). The golden rule therefore means
that the change in debt must equal the change in the capital stock. If the capital
stock is growing, with new capital expenditure exceeding depreciation, debt will
be growing at the same rate. If the capital stock is declining, debt also will
decline.
A final point worth drawing out is that, in a multiple-asset context, the front-
loading properties of conventional depreciation will have the effect of
•   artificially worsening the accrual operating result under circumstances where
the fixed asset portfolio is weighted towards relatively new assets (as a result
of, say, relatively high levels of capital expenditure in recent years), and
•   artificially improving the operating result if assets tend on average to be
rather old, reflecting a dearth of recent capital expenditure.
Conventional depreciation tends to be used in the public sector accrual
accounting models developed to date, although there is some interest in annuity
depreciation. The more irregular are patterns of capital expenditure, the more
this use of conventional depreciation can be expected to distort the reported
accrual budget outcome.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF PAST BREACHES OF THE GOLDEN RULE
In a multiple-asset context, it remains the case that consistent application of the
golden rule will mean that public sector net worth will equal zero. However, one
cannot expect it to be the case that governments have in the past consistently
abided by the golden rule. If they have not, then inherited net worth levels may
be significantly different from zero. If, for example, past generations have
disproportionately contributed to the cost of the existing stock of assets, net
worth may be positive. Conversely, net worth might be significantly negative if
people in the past failed, overall, to pay their way. One way of viewing this
negative net worth is as an ‘excess’ level of public debt   that is, an amount by
which debt levels have come to exceed asset values in the balance sheet.
If there is an inherited ‘excess’ level of debt, then there will, as a
consequence, be a greater interest burden than would be the case if net worth
were zero and debt therefore equalled assets.
6 Taxes would need to be higher as
a consequence. If they were not, public debt levels would, under normal
conditions, grow at a faster rate than GDP   and therefore faster than the
capacity of the community to pay taxes to meet interest obligations   and there
would sooner or later be a ‘fiscal sustainability’ problem (Feldstein, 1976;
Boskin, 1982). It should be noted in this context that the standard accrual
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approach treats all interest costs as an expense in the current time period 
without any attempt to distinguish between, and treat differently, interest
commitments arising from legitimate asset financing and interest commitments
arising from the inappropriate past use of debt to fund current expenditure.
Therefore, to implement the golden rule in the form of a requirement for
balanced accrual budgets, while conforming with this standard accrual treatment
of interest costs, is implicitly to adopt a particular solution to the problem of
inherited excess debt: namely, that taxpayers in each period shoulder the whole
of the extra interest burden from that excess debt. If they do this, then the
amount of excess debt will remain constant, and so consequently will the
inherited level of net worth.
Given this approach, the golden rule can, regardless of the inherited net worth
position, continue to be expressed as a requirement that the budget be balanced
in accrual terms. The cash accounting approximation of this remains, moreover,
the rule that the current account surplus should equal depreciation.
The stock equivalent of these rules, however, is now no longer the
maintenance of zero net worth, but rather the maintenance of constant real net
worth. No longer will it necessarily be the case that the level of debt will equal
the capital stock. However, it will remain true that changes in the level of public
debt will equal changes in the public capital stock. Or rather, this would be
literally true if it were not for further complicating factors, to which we now
turn.
V. BALANCED ACCRUAL BUDGETS VS. CONSTANT NET WORTH
The simple model employed so far has embodied an exact ‘articulation’ between
the accrual operating statement and the balance sheet. That is, any accrual
operating deficit means a precisely equivalent reduction in net worth, and vice
versa. And any operating surplus will mean an increase in net worth.
In the real world, however, this pleasing picture is marred by a complication
that cannot be overlooked. In accrual balance sheets, debt is usually subject to
‘market’ valuation, and the market value of debt fluctuates with changes in
expectations of future interest rates. This means that it is not precisely true that
net borrowings (i.e. the cash deficit) equal the change in debt. Rather, the change
in debt equals new borrowings plus the impact of market revaluations on the pre-
existing stock of debt (known as ‘valuation effects’).
This imparts a degree of volatility to the net worth measure. To maintain net
worth precisely constant would, under these circumstances, require that current-
period taxes be raised or lowered at short notice to offset fluctuations in the
market value of debt. Such an approach would be impracticable and have little to
recommend it in terms of principle.
The pragmatic solution to this problem is to insulate the accrual operating
result from the impact of these fluctuations. This may be achieved by choosingMeasuring Compliance with the Golden Rule
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not to recognise capital gains or losses from fluctuations in the real market value
of outstanding government debt as revenue or expenses in the operating
statement. This is more or less what standard versions of CPP or CCA accrual
methodology do. Crucially, however, this breaks the precise ‘articulation’
between the operating statement and the balance sheet to which we referred
above. It is no longer the case that the operating result and changes in net worth
precisely mirror each other. As a consequence, the golden rule is expressed more
exactly as a requirement for balanced accrual budgets than as a requirement for
the maintenance of constant net worth. The ‘maintenance of constant net worth’
may, nevertheless, be regarded as a reasonable approximation of the rule.
These valuation effects on the liabilities side of the balance sheet arise as a
consequence of uncertainty. Uncertainty can also have analogous effects upon
the assets side of the balance sheet. This issue cannot be properly dealt with
here. However, as an example, changed community needs or technologies might
mean that what was thought to be a valuable asset unexpectedly becomes
essentially useless. Under these circumstances, it might be appropriate to write
off the asset entirely, in which case it would once again make sense to insulate
the operating statement from the effects of the consequent balance-sheet
discontinuity.
VI. CURRENT COST ACCOUNTING
Current cost accounting currently enjoys considerable favour amongst those who
make public sector accounting policy in countries that have been moving to
accrual accounting (Byatt, 1986; UK Treasury, 1994, p. 35; Australian
Accounting Research Foundation, 1995, pp. 7 and 25; Steering Committee on
National Performance Monitoring of Government Enterprises, 1994). There are
two related forms of CCA. The first is what we might call ‘replacement cost’
CCA. Essentially, whereas CPP values fixed assets on the basis of initial real
cost, replacement cost CCA values them in terms of the real cost of replacing the
asset with a new asset with the same productive capability (Whittington, 1983).
The essential principle underpinning replacement cost CCA is that of
‘operating capital maintenance’. This contrasts with the alternative principle of
‘financial capital maintenance’, which is implicit in the methodology
recommended in this paper. Financial capital maintenance means that, at the end
of the life of a fixed asset, cumulative depreciation charges will have ‘covered’
the full initial (real) cost. Thus the financial position of the public sector will
have been maintained. By contrast, under the replacement cost approach,
cumulative depreciation charges will sum instead to an amount sufficient to
purchase an ‘equivalent’ replacement asset. This replacement cost will
frequently differ from the initial cost of the asset. In the presence of technical
progress, for example, the replacement cost of an asset might be less than its
initial real cost. Under these circumstances, if the initial cost of the asset wereFiscal Studies
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entirely borrowed, and it were not intended to replace the asset at the end of its
life, depreciation charges would be insufficient to amortise the initial debt, and a
residual debt would remain. Those who had benefited from the asset during its
working life would not, in other words, have paid the full costs incurred in
generating those benefits. Conversely, if replacement cost for some reason
exceeds initial real cost, employing replacement cost CCA would involve
beneficiaries being charged more than required by intergenerational equity.
Financial capital maintenance and operating capital maintenance arose in
private sector accounting theory as the basis for alternative conceptions of profit.
Supporters of the latter doctrine have argued that, as long as a manufacturer of,
say, cardboard boxes retains sufficient funds to be able to replace its existing
plant with another plant of the same output capacity at the appropriate time,
earnings over and above such retained amounts could be viewed as profit.
Supporters of financial capital maintenance respond that one cannot base a
concept of profit on the potentially unwarranted assumption that such a company
will choose to continue producing cardboard boxes for ever and a day,
eschewing any change in the nature or mix of its business activities. They also
point out that financial capital maintenance is consistent with the economic
concept of profit as the increment in real financial wealth. These are persuasive
points. Overall, it would appear that the operating capital maintenance principle
has little to recommend it in a commercial context, and even less to recommend
it in the context of non-commercial core government.
What are the implications of the use of replacement cost CCA for the
usefulness of the accrual operating balance as an intergenerational equity
measure? When replacement costs are less than the initial real cost of the asset,
the result is an artificial improvement in the accrual operating result. Conversely,
when replacement costs exceed initial real cost, the accrual operating result will
be made to look worse than it should from an intergenerational equity
perspective. The direction and magnitude of the net effect are empirical
questions. However, it may be guessed that the impact is unlikely to be so great
as to prevent the CCA operating results from serving as a reasonable proxy
indicator of compliance with the golden rule   at least if corrected for
distortions arising from the failure to employ annuity depreciation.
As noted above, there are two related forms of CCA, the ‘replacement cost’
variant being the first. The second, somewhat more complicated, version of CCA
is what is known as ‘deprival value’ methodology. It is this version of CCA that
has generally been widely favoured in the public sector in recent years. The
intention of deprival value CCA is to value fixed assets at the lesser of
replacement cost and economic value (as defined above). In practice, economic
values are difficult to measure, so replacement cost tends to be used by default
even when economic value should by rights be used (see, for example, Heald and
Scott (1995, p. 62)). Consequently, the distinction between ‘deprival value’ and
‘replacement cost’ CCA tends to be greater at the conceptual than at the practicalMeasuring Compliance with the Golden Rule
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level. The distinction should not, however, be overlooked, because advocates of
the deprival value methodology have supported their case with a set of
arguments quite distinct from the ‘operating capital maintenance’ doctrine
summarised above. They assert the relevance of deprival value CCA for
managerial decision-making, flowing from what they see as its basis in decision-
relevant ‘economic’ concepts of cost and value (for example, Edwards, Kay and
Mayer (1987), Byatt (1986) and Rowles (1992)). It is primarily because of these
purported managerial benefits that deprival value CCA has attracted support
within the public sector. I have critically evaluated these issues elsewhere,
arguing that the managerial value of CCA has been greatly exaggerated and that
it is a mistake to base public sector financial reporting systems on supposed
managerial accounting applications (Robinson, 1998b). The implication of this
view is that, unless one is to run two accrual systems in parallel in order to
derive limited managerial benefits from the CCA system, the choice of accrual
methodology should be determined by the need to properly measure compliance
with the golden rule.
VII. FURTHER COMMENTS ON THE BALANCE SHEET
As noted earlier, the valuation of ‘social’ assets in our preferred balance sheet
does not purport to be a measure of what assets are worth. The economic value
of a social asset is not what is recorded in the balance sheet. The same point
applies to commercial assets: balance sheets, irrespective of the methodology
upon which they are based, generally do not recognise government business
enterprises at their economic value. The same is true for similar assets in the
private sector. If one wants a measure of economic value, one is better off
looking at capital market valuations.
The fundamental reason for this is that the estimation of the economic value
of such assets   which yield an inherently variable return and for which there is
no well-defined market price   is so much a matter of judgement that economic
valuations are simply too subjective and manipulable to serve as the basis for a
balance sheet.
This is one of the reasons why net worth is not a measure of solvency.
Another reason is that the power to tax (of which there is no private sector
counterpart) is an ‘asset’ that is not part of the balance sheet. To put the point
differently, negative net worth indicates nothing about the government’s capacity
to meet its financial obligations as long as it is in a position to increase taxes. In
New Zealand in the early 1990s, the presentation to the public of a public sector
balance sheet purporting to show substantial negative net worth led government
leaders and the media to claim that the government was in some sense insolvent,
and that it was essential to take firm fiscal measures to rapidly restore solvency.
This was a sensationalist misuse of the notion of solvency. All that negative net
worth indicates is that, at some stage in the past, taxpayers probably failed toFiscal Studies
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‘pay their way’ in the manner required by the golden rule. It does not, moreover,
necessarily mean that immediate measures should be taken to ‘restore’ the
balance sheet by making present taxpayers bear the full cost of the sins of the
past.
Some economists have conceptualised partial or comprehensive public
balance sheets which are based consistently upon economic valuation concepts.
A comprehensive balance sheet on, say, the model put forward by Buiter (1990)
would in principle provide a solvency measure.
7 This type of balance sheet is,
however, a purely theoretical tool rather than a practicable proposition.
While the development of a balance sheet does not provide a measure of
solvency, it nevertheless does provide some improvement in measures of fiscal
sustainability. An important determinant of fiscal sustainability is the magnitude
of the financial obligations passed on by government to future taxpayers. A by-
product of traditional cash accounting was a tendency to measure those future
obligations in terms of debt alone.
8 The trouble with this is, of course, that debt
is by no means the only financial obligation passed on to future taxpayers. There
are other important obligations (such as lease obligations and employee
entitlements such as pensions), and there are offsets such as the future revenue
stream of government business enterprises. The benefit of a balance sheet here is
that it provides a wider perspective on future financial obligations by including
many of these non-debt financial assets and liabilities. Thus a typical balance
sheet will include an augmented measure of net financial liabilities
9 that includes
not only debt but some of the other relevant assets and liabilities including, in
particular, future pension obligations. This net financial liabilities measure is the
best available robust measure of fiscal sustainability.
The net financial liabilities measure is not to be confused with net worth.
What it is, in approximate terms, is net worth minus the balance-sheet ‘values’ of
the social assets and government business enterprises. There are two reasons
why the latter balance-sheet values are best left to one side in an indicator of
future financial obligations. The first is that, as noted above, these ‘values’ do
not measure economic value. The second is that social assets yield no revenue,
so that even a measure of their economic value would arguably muddy any
indicator of fiscal sustainability.
The conclusion to which this points is that net worth should be regarded as an
indicator of intergenerational equity rather than as an indicator of fiscal
sustainability. This is consistent with the tendency of policymakers to combine
the golden rule with a rule designed to guarantee fiscal sustainability, such as a
rule that the ratio of debt to GDP (or, better still, net financial liabilities to GDP)
                                                                                                                                   
7This is because it would extend the concept of assets to include the present value of future taxes and extend
the concept of liabilities to include the present value of future expenditure.
8Or, more precisely, in terms of net debt, which is debt owed by the government to others minus financial
assets such as debt owed by others to the government.
9Perhaps termed something like ‘excess of total liabilities over financial assets’.Measuring Compliance with the Golden Rule
461
should not exceed some specified maximum (see, for example, UK Treasury
(1997, p. 10)).
Some advocates of CCA appear to believe that CCA can cure this deficiency
in the information provided by a public sector balance sheet, by creating a
balance sheet based upon the consistent application of the economic concept of
value to all assets and liabilities. This is, however, not the case. Fixed asset
valuation in a CCA balance sheet is, as pointed out above, predominantly based
upon cost-based ‘valuation’ rather than economic valuation. This is true in
theory and even more true in practice. The crucial point is that, as Whittington
(1983, p. 116) puts it, ‘replacement cost is a cost rather than a value’.
The growing use of public sector balance sheets can be expected to produce
new types of misconceptions in coming years. A case in point is the treatment of
asset sales. Under cash accounting, governments have frequently used asset sales
revenue to artificially reduce the reported budget deficit. A claim frequently
made by exponents of accrual accounting is that ‘accrual budgets would
eliminate distortions in the cash based budget deficit or surplus caused by asset
sales’ (National Commission of Audit, 1996, p. 224). This view is based upon a
belief that ‘asset sales have no effect [upon net worth] when the asset is sold for
its real value’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1995, p. B-3). The problem with
this is that it falsely assumes that a public sector balance sheet will value
relevant assets at their ‘real’ (i.e. economic) value. To the extent that asset values
recorded in the balance sheet will tend, in many instances, to be less than
economic values, it will remain open to dishonest governments to employ asset
sales to perpetrate electorally motivated fiscal ‘smoke and mirrors’ tricks, albeit
that the scale of the deceit involved will at least be reduced significantly.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A commitment to the golden rule calls for the adoption of a specific form of
accrual accounting, based upon the principles of real financial capital
maintenance and annuity depreciation. Such a version of accrual accounting
differs in certain significant respects from the combination of current cost
accounting methodology and conventional depreciation which at present
dominates public sector accrual accounting policy. Use of the latter may
materially distort measures of intergenerational equity.
Although the golden rule has often been expressed as a requirement for the
maintenance of constant net worth, it is more precisely embodied in the principle
of structurally balanced accrual budgets.
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